The Necessity of Moral Realism

Scranton in the introduction to his book gives a fairly apathetic view towards metaethics and the ontological foundations of morality. Scranton claims that what he cares most about is

If we could characterize the method of reasoning through which we arrive at judgments of right and wrong, and could explain why there is good reason to give judgments arrived at in this way the kind of importance that moral judgments are normally thought to have, then we would, I believe, have given a sufficient answer to the question of the subject matter of right and wrong as well. (What we owe to each other 2000)

Scranton believes that merely outlining the methods of arriving at moral conclusions absolves us of the need for an ontological foundation for morality. I disagree. All studies of ethics must start with the ontological nature of morality. For if morality is relative to cultures and our sociobiological environment, how could one confidently trust their moral conclusions? All attempts at cultural improvement would be moot, for to what is our culture improving towards? If investors didn’t have a mutual understanding of the value of money, how would they be able to carry out their investments? Moral realism is the only metaethics form that allows for an objective standard of morality by which we can delve into more specific applications of morality.

What we owe to each other [Introduction]. (2000). In 1304794479 959921307 T. M. Scanlon (Author), What we owe to each other. Harvard University Press.